Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Environments
Map 1—Baghdad’s Urban Political Districts
Map 3—Location of Projects in Rusafa by Agency Responsible, April 2003-September 2010

Map does not include an additional 706 USAID micro loans and 142 Army micro grants whose location within Rusafa could not be determined.

Source: SIGIR analysis of reconstruction data
Goal: Getting long term effects from issuing micro-grants, not just throwing money at the problem.
Desired Effect: Twofold: 1.) Gets local Iraqis used to going through their own local government for economic assistance/problem solving; 2.) Puts a level of responsibility on the process at the local levels.

• Process:
  – Early in the micro-grant fight we engaged the District Council economic committee chairman on the process of giving money to start up or expand businesses.
  – Working with the committee, blank micro-grant applications distributed to all the neighborhood chairmen with a two per “Hayy” goal for the initial batch and the committee as the point of collection.
  – Gave the committee an unclassified map of Rusafa so they could plot the locations of the businesses. (effectively translated street, building and muhallah into 8-digit grid)
  – The Iraqis collected the micro-grant applications, business owner and business pictures, and plotted the business on a map for 3-89 CAV.
  – 3-89 CAV visited nominated businesses for final vetting.

• Concerns / Issues:
  – Chairman taking care of their friends and families with micro-grants
    • Solution: The committee was surprisingly helpful in weeding out these situations and identifying targeted micro-grant applicants. (trade shops: carpentry, generator repair, metal working)
$8,728,179 on 87 projects
$396,500 on 144 microgrants

30 enemy Killed, 12 Wounded
111 Enemy captured
Timeline of Events:

- **25 Oct** - Posters distributed targeting routes into Rusafa from Isam’s primary hideout in Sadr City.
- **26 Oct** - Recognizing his face on a wanted banner, an associate of Isam Sharuqi contacts 43/11 Iraqi Army Brigade in order to collect the reward of $3,500.00 dollars.
- **27 Oct** - 43/11 IA develops the intelligence and conducts cross boundary coordination with 42/11 IA.
- **28 Oct** - Using the wanted banner to assist in identification, 42/11 IA and the source arrest Isam Sharuqi at a Barber Shop in Sadr City.
- **29 Oct** - 3/89 CAV receives custody of Sharuqi

WO Mohamed Dakhel Hameed, an intel officer from 42/11 IA, is responsible for the capture of Sharuqi.
What Lessons Should We Learn?

- Accountability: Ground commander must understand and support.
- Unity of Command: Ground commander, DoS, USAID, USACE?
- Sustainability: Will the locals be able to man, repair, and operate the facility?
  - No more “Lions Square”-type projects (our good idea without local interest or support or even measurable definition of “success”).
- Establish independent oversight immediately.
  - “Next time, you may consider not allowing the test takers to grade their own papers.
- Establish measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
  - Stop using amount of money spent or number of projects completed or ongoing as a measure of unit/individual success.
  - “…projects would be limited in number by me based on a unit’s ability to follow up and account for the actual impact of the project and the effort expended.”
- First, establish security!
Questions?

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