"Using AT/FP Requirements and UFC 4-020-01 Design Process to Increase Climate and Natural Hazard Resilience of Military Installation Infrastructure and Mission-critical Assets!"

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Climate and Severe Weather Hazards in Action







Agenda

- Key Terms and Definitions
- Perspectives on Resilience
- Typical Climate/Natural Hazards
- Mission-Critical Design Standards
- Adapting UFC 04-010-01 Process for Installation Climate Impact Analysis
- Using UFC 4-020-01 Spreadsheets



True Story: The Marshall Fire Urban Wild-Fire 8 Miles North of My Home in Arvada, Colorado 30 December 2021

On our way to lunch...

After lunch...



NPR.org



Boulder County Colorado Urban Wildfire - 30 December 2021

- The wildfire was fueled by 55 mile an hour winds gusting to 70/80/105 mph
- Created a "blowtorch" effect
- Grew quickly to 122 acres (49 hectares) with no containment
- 35,000 people evacuated... some with less than 30 seconds to leave!
- 2 people died...
- > 1000 pets perished...



6,200 acres burned

Over 1000 homes and other buildings destroyed

Over 2 Billion \$\$ in damages

It snowed the next day...




Lessons Learned and Effective Design

See: <u>firewise-construction2012.pdf</u>


"Site Design & Building Materials Based on the 2009 International Wildland-Urban Interface Code"

Chapter 4: Building Design

- Vents, eaves, soffits, gutters, downspouts and decks
- Ignition-resistant construction class



"The eave should be covered with a soffit. If the soffit is applied directly to the rafter eave, it forms a sloping soffit, which creates a pocket that can trap fire."





Indicators for Prioritization of Climate and Natural Hazard Impacts


- Location specific Asset Data
 - Geographic location
 - Proximity to hazard
 - Past events
 - Site-specific knowledge
 - Physical condition
 - Age
 - Mission/Purpose/Criticality
 - Exposure, Sensitivity, Adaptive Capacity
 - Vulnerability
 - Security
 - Design and Construction Standards



Typical Climate Severe Weather and Natural Hazards

- Severe Wind: Hurricane, Tornado
- Flooding: Riverine, Coastal, Pluvial
- Severe Temperature: Heat and Cold
- Lightning
- Drought/Water Scarcity
- Wild-Fire

The River Neckar, Heidelberg, June 3, 2024; 3 m above regular level; reached 5.1 m above that day. AP





Have a Shared Understanding of Terms and Definitions!


- <u>Hazard</u> A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation.
- (DoD Dictionary, 2021)
- Resilience The ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions.
- (DoDD 4715.21)
- <u>Risk</u> Probability and severity of loss linked to threats or hazards and vulnerabilities.
- (DoDD 3020.40)





Increasing Military Installation Resilience

https://www.specialwarfaretw.af.mil/News/Video/?videoid=899620&dvpTag=NDR&dvpcc=false#DVIDSVideoPlayer43860







3 Key Perspectives on Resilience

- Scientific: Sustainability, Environmental Species, Carbon, Air, Land, Water, Data
- Engineering: Standards, Design, Construction Built and Natural Infrastructure, Nature Based-Solutions (NBS)
- Organizational: Managerial, Operational Leadership, Managers, Operators, Staff, Assets, Risks, Opportunities, Objectives
- Organizations need to learn and understand:
 - Mission-Critical Infrastructure and Asset Design and Construction Needs
 - Perspective interfaces, interdependencies and linkages
 - Data, Goals, Outcomes
 - Technological, human, and asset capability and capacity
 - How and When to "Take Action to Achieve Objectives and Outcomes!"



How Building Design and (Going Above) Construction Standards Reduce Asset and Human Risk and Increase Resilience



House on Mexico Beach in Florida, USA that survived Hurricane Michael


Source: CNN





Key Lessons Learned and Areas of Focus

- Existing/Available Data vs Proprietary Data (Beware of Black Boxes!)
- Local, Region, Country, International Exposures, Conditions, Characteristics, Vulnerability
- Prioritization/Characteristics: Infrastructure/Asset Sensitivity, Vulnerability
- Conditions Inside and Outside the Fence
- Supply Chains





Refining UFC 4-010-01 and 4-020-01 to Accommodate Severe Weather and Other Natural Hazards



AT Requirement Sources, History

Intent

- Minimize mass casualties
- Standardization across DoD to reduce subjectivity for reasonable and justifiable levels of threat and protection

Evolution of DoD AT Requirements

- 1999: **Interim** after Khobar findings
- 2002: First version of UFC 4-010-01
- 2003: Standoff per **25 m & 45 m**
- 2007: Minor changes
- 2012: Standoff per bldg. materials
- 2013: Minor changes
- 2018: VBIED threat tactic eliminated as minimum standard (But not in EUCOM)

UFC 4-010-01 9 February 2012 Change 1, 1 October 2013

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

Dod MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS




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AT Requirement Sources for DoD Facilities

- Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC)
 - UFC 4-010-01 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
 - UFC 4-010-03 Security Measures for High-Risk Personnel
 - UFC 4-020-01 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual
 - UFC 4-020-02 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual
 - UFC 4-021-01 Mass Notification Systems
 - UFC 4-022-01 Access Control Points
 - UFC 4-022-02 Selection of Vehicle Barriers
- Theater and Agency Supplements
 - U.S. European Command AT Operations Order 23-01
 - Army Europe Regulation 525-13 Antiterrorism
 - IMCOM-Europe Guidelines for Offices
 - DoDEA Protection Criteria 4-010-01
 - Army Standard for Access Control Points, 2020
 - NATO ACO Directive 80-25 Force Protection





Minimum AT Standards for Buildings UFC 4-010-01, Introduction

Applicability:

- New Construction
- Changes to Existing Buildings
- Change of Occupancy
- Window Replacement Projects
- HVAC Replacement Projects
- Leased Buildings
- See UFC for more...

Exemptions:

- "Low Occupancy" Buildings (<11 people)
- "Temporary" and Relocatable Buildings,
 Transitional Spaces
- Not Routinely Occupied
- See UFC for more...

UFC 4-010-01 12 December 2018 Change 2, 30 July 2022

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

Dod MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS



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Minimum AT Standards, Introduction

- UFC 4-020-01 must be used to determine the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and Level Of Protection (LOP) for each project
- Use minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01 only when UFC 4-020-01 calculations result in no identified threat or level of protection





Facility DBT

- UFC 4-020-01 Chapter 3, Design Criteria Development
 - Risk is function of criticality, threat, and vulnerability
 - Step 1: Convene the planning team
 - Step 2: Identify assets
 - Step 3: Determine asset value
 - Step 4: Identify aggressor likelihoods
 - Step 5: Identify **tactics** and threat **severity** levels
 - Step 6: Consolidate into initial design basis threat (DBT)
 - Step 7: Determine initial level of protection (LOP)
 - Step 8: Determine planning risk levels
 - Step 9: Assess acceptability of risk levels
 - Step 10: Identify user constraints

UFC 4-020-01 11 September 2008

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual



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Facility DBT, Protection Parameters (Climate DBT Mock-up)

- UFC 4-020-01 Chapter 4, Protection
 Design Strategies
 - Vehicle bomb tactics (stationary & moving)
 - Hand delivered devices
 - Indirect fire weapons
 - Direct fire weapons
 - Low LOP: block sightlines
 - High LOP: harden building elements (e.g. 4" RC for 7.62mm)
 - Airborne contamination tactic
 - Waterborne contamination tactic
 - Waterfront attack tactic
 - Forced entry tactic
 - Low LOP: 1 min. delay
 - High LOP: 15 min. delay
 - Covert entry tactic
 - Visual surveillance tactic

		DI	3T	D	es	igr	C	rit	er	ia	Sι	ım	m	ar	y V	No	ork	sh	ee	et							
Project or Building =>	tal adn	al admin building						Analyst =>				Climate Hawk				Date =>					2/27/2030						
Assets	Asset Category	Asset Value Rating	Damaging winds		Rain		Wildfire	Wildfire Tropical event		Tornado		Lightning		Extreme temperature		Coastal flooding		Rising		1000 year flood		Flash flood			Hail		
	Asset	AssetV	D B T	L O P	D B T	LOP	D B T	L O P	D B T	LOP	D B T	L O P	D B T	LOP	D B T	LOP	D B T	LOP	D B T	LOP	D B T	L O P	D B T	LOP	D B T	L O P	D B T
General population	A	0.67	L	L	L	L	L	L	м	L	м	L	м	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Mission critical population	A	0.50	L	L	L	L	L	L	м	L	м	L	M	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Arms and ammunition	В	0.63	L	L	L	L	L	L	м	L	м	L	M	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Critical infrastructure and industrial equipment	0	0.65	L	L	L	٦	L	L	м	L	М	L	M	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Data centers	D	0.70	L	L	L	L	L	L	м	L	м	L	М	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Activities and operations	R	0.52	L	L	L	L	L	L	М	L	м	L	М	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
		0.00																						2000000			2000



Asset Ratings

- Severity Levels
- Levels of Protection
- Asset Categories
- Asset Value Rating

Table 3-5. Impact on the National Defense

Impact of Asset's Loss on the National Defense	Value Rating Factor
The loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the asset or operation's /activity's	0
compromise could have insignificant impact on the United States or a region.	
The loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the asset or operation's /activity's	1
compromise could have significant mission impact on a regional level.	
The loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the asset or operation's /activity's	2
compromise could compromise the defense infrastructure of the United States.	
The loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the asset or operation's /activity's	3
compromise could impact the tactical capability of the United States.	
The loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the asset or operation's /activity's	4
compromise could be expected to harm the operational capability of the United States.	
The loss, theft, destruction, or misuse of the asset or operation's /activity's	5
compromise could result in great harm to the strategic capability of the United States.	



Key Criteria

- Adaptation of Ratings to Key Assets
- Criticality
- Key Climate Hazards
- Likelihood Ratings
- Ranking
- Prioritization

Tactics Threat explosives, and Design Criteria (May also be based on identified vulnerabilities) Assets Levels of Protection User Constraints

Figure 3-1. Design Criteria



Asset Value and Climate/Severe Weather Hazard (Climate DBT Mock-up)

UFC ASSET VALUE / AGGRESSOR LIKELIHOOD WORKSHEET																									
- 10	A. 11	50000	Coastal admin				nin		Asset > General population										Analyst =>			Climate Hawk			
Project or Building >> building			Asset Category ⇒ A				Asset Value				0.67		Date =>			2/27/2030									
١	/alue R	lating I	actors							,				-		,	,			,			- 0		
Criticality to User / Population Type (9	Impact on National Defense	Replaceability	Political Sensitivity	Relative Value to User	Sum of Value Factors	Value Pating to	Potiential Aggressors	Aggressor Goales	Hazards	Installation Location(4)	Current features	Proximity	Availability (4) (7886-3-13)	(#1 (fabbe_3_14)	(Table_3_15)	(Table_3_16)	emergency services	(Table_3_18)	(Table_3_19)	History (8) / Intentions(9)	(Talle_1_1)	(1,2,1)	Sum of Likelihood Factors	Likelihood Patings®	
1	enera	l Pop			Section		_					- 1											2/40	200	
5			3	2	10	0.67			damaging winds	2	4	4	3				0			24			37	0.21	
Operations and Activitie							rain flooding	2	4	4	3				0			8			21	0.12			
					0	0.00			wildfire	2	4	4	3				0			24			37	0.21	
	Data ce	enters				0.00			tropical event	2	4	4	3				0			30			43	0.24	
	All O	ther A	sets						tornado	2	4	4	3				0			24			37	0.21	
					0	0.00			lightning	2	4	4	3				0			24			37	0.21	
	1000000					0.67			extreme temperature	2	4	4	3				0			24			37	0.21	
Proceed to Aggressor Likelihood							coastal flooding	2	4	4	3				0			30			43	0.24			
							snow	2	4	4	3				0			24			37	0.21			
	LIF	Keil	1100	u					Flash flood	2	4	4	3				0			30			43	0.24	
									Proceed to Tactics, I	OBT a	nd LO	OP W	orks	heet	for G	REEN	Aggr	essor	s [Lik	eliho	od >	.50]			
Popu	ulation	type a	pplies	to gen	eral po	pulation o	nly.							4. Facto	ers that s	hould be t	he same	for all ag	gressors	or given	asset.				



Summarized Example of Rating and UFC Design Criteria

- Likelihood Determinations
- Asset Value Ratings
- Climate/Natural Hazards
- Rating Scores
- What the scores indicate!
- How the UFC design criteria come into play.

_____Table 3-10. Asset Location

____Installation or facility Location

____Likelihood Rating Factor

Located away from any known climate hazards __1

Located in an area with less than two climate hazards classifed as minor (lighting, high wind)

_2

Located in an area with 2-4 climate hazards and at least one major threat __4

Located located in an area with more than 4 climate hazards and at least two major hazards
_5

	able 3-11. Installation current features	#N 58			
current features	_Likelihood Rating Factor				
Installation or facility la	cks any climate hardening	_5			
A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	s very minor climate hardening	_4 _3			
Installation or facility has moderate climate hardening					
Installation or facility ha	s robust climate hardening	_2			
Installation or facility ha	s significant hardening	_1			



Summarized Example of Rating and UFC Design Criteria

Table 3.12 prox	imity to hazards
Asset Location and Access Controls	_Likelihood Rating Factor
_The facility in which or at which the asset is loca to climactic hazards 0	ted is in an area not in any proximity
_The facility in which or at which the asset is local proximity to climactic hazards 2	ted is in an area that is within in minor
_The facility in which or at which the asset is loca climactic hazards4	ted is in moderate proximity to
_The facility in which or at which the asset is loca hazards6	ted is in major proximity to climactic
_The facility in which or at which the asset is loca climactic hazards 8	ted is in significant proximity to
_The facility in which or at which the asset is local	ted is directly on or within a climactic

Table 3-13. Asset Availability **Asset Availability** Likelihood Rating Factor Similar assets are widely available both on and in the immediate vicinity off the installation or site Similar assets have limited availability in the immediate vicinity off the installation, but are widely available on the installation or site Similar assets are not available in the immediate vicinity off the installation, but are widely available on the installation or site Similar assets have limited availability on the installation and are not available in the immediate vicinity off the installation or site Similar assets are available at fewer than 3 other locations on the installation and are not available in the immediate vicinity off the installation or site There are no similar assets on or off the installation except at this location or site 5



Summarized Example of Rating and UFC Design Criteria

Table 3-17. emergency services locations

Emergency services available but more than 20 miles or 10 km from installation 10

Emergency services available but more than 10 miles or 5 km from installation 8

Emergency services available but more than 5 miles or 2.5 km from installation 6

Emergency services available nearby but off installation 4

Emergency services available on installation but limited 2

Emergency services available on installation and fully capable 0

Local data center, with redundancy 2
Local data center without redundancy 4
Regional data center with redundancy 6
Regional data center without redundancy 8
Strategic data center with redundancy 10
Strategic data center without redundancy 12

Lu incluir i	Table 3-20. History of Acts Against Like Assets /
Terrorist Intention	
Aggressor / Factor	History or
Intention	Likelihood Rating
Factor	
Aggressor: All except fir hazard 6	e or flood-Factor: HistoryThere is no history of
	e or flood-Factor: HistoryThere is little or no history
Aggressor: All except fir	e or flood-Factor: HistoryThere is history of hazard end in the last 10 years.
	e or flood-Factor: HistoryThere history of hazard ened in the last 5 years.
아이들이 두다가 받았다. 이 스타스에 살아가게 하는데 되었다면 하다는 방향이 되었다.	e or flood-Factor: HistoryThere is a history of ned with in the last two years
Aggressor: fire or flood_ _2	_No history of fire or flood
_ Aggressor: fire or flood_ last 10 years	_There is a history of fire or floods however not in the
	_there is a history of fire or flood within the last 5
Aggressor: fire or flood_ installation8	_fire or floods happen locally yearly but not near
Aggressor: fire or flood_	_fire or floods threaten the installation yearly



Benefits of Adapting 4-010-01 and 4-020-01 for Severe Weather and Natural Hazards

- Refining UFC 4-020-01 with climate/severe weather/natural hazard elements can provide validated process to identify climate and natural hazard risks
- Refining 4-010-01 to accommodate climate and other natural hazards can benefit installations with increased resilience
- Like the AT DBT, a climate/severe weather/natural hazard DBT can help justify costs of climate hardening
- Refinements can clearly show related design basis threat level of protection for assets



Presentation Summary and Questions

- Key Terms and Definitions
- Perspectives on Resilience
- Typical Climate/Severe Weather and Natural Hazards
- Mission-Critical Design Standards
- Adapting UFC 04-010-01 Process for Climate/Severe Weather/Natural Hazard Impact Analysis
- Using UFC 4-020-01 Spreadsheets

The River Neckar, Heidelberg, June 3, 2024; 3m above regular level; reached 5.1m above that day. AP

